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Social Studies of Science, Vol. 36, No. 5, 659-690 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/0306312706059460

Bioweapons Proliferation

Where Science Studies and Public Policy Collide

Kathleen Vogel

Department of Science and Technology Studies, 306 Rockefeller Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA; fax: +1 607 254 5000; kmv8{at}cornell.edu

Post 9/11 concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have highlighted the importance of understanding the fundamental nature of tacit weapons knowledge and its transfer mechanisms. Existing conceptualizations of tacit knowledge, however, are insufficient to assess the proliferation threat and the development of specific nonproliferation policies. Some would argue that this is particularly true of biological weapons, which involve dual-use technologies that are continually advancing and diffusing. This paper will illustrate the difficulties in applying notions of tacit knowledge to real-world policymaking by examining the development of Soviet biological weapons and the subsequent proliferation threat posed by scientists from a Kazakh bioweapons facility. With the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the subsequent establishment of US nonproliferation assistance programs, new metrics are needed to assess how tacit knowledge possessed by these weapons scientists may erode over time and what implications that may have for proliferation and the development of effective nonproliferation and counterterrorism policies.

Key Words: biological weapons • bioterrorism • nonproliferation • replication • sociology of scientific knowledge • tacit knowledge • testing


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